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OPINION*
______________ 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.   
Appellant Rose Tree Media School District (“Rose Tree”) appeals the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment concluding that Rose Tree was obligated to enroll 
Appellee G.S. under Subtitle VII-B of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act 
(“McKinney-Vento” or the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 11434a(2) and § 11432(g)(3)(A)(i).   We 
agree with the District Court that G.S. satisfies the Act’s definition of youth 
homelessness because he has been living in his maternal grandmother’s home, along 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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with his parents, ever since his parents lost their home in November 2014.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm. 
I. 
In 2010, G.S., along with his parents, his two sisters, and his paternal 
grandparents, moved into a rental home within Rose Tree.  At the time, G.S. and his 
sister, S.S., attended schools within Rose Tree.  In November 2014, G.S.’s parents were 
unable to make payments and lost the home.  As a result, G.S. moved in with Ba.S., his 
maternal grandmother.  The grandmother’s single-family, 1500-square foot row house 
was located outside of Rose Tree.   
With the addition of G.S., a total of ten people—five adults and five children—
resided in the grandmother’s home.  Initially, G.S. slept in the living room with his 
parents and two sisters.  At times, G.S. moved his cot to the kitchen or basement to 
obtain some privacy.  The parties agree that, to date, G.S.’s living conditions remain 
unchanged.   
Rose Tree immediately learned of the change in G.S.’s living conditions.  At that 
time, Rose Tree deemed G.S. and S.S. homeless and thus continued to enroll them in a 
manner consistent with its obligations under McKinney-Vento, 42 U.S. § 
11432(g)(3)(A)(i).   
In January 2015—less than two months after G.S. moved in with his maternal 
grandmother—he was involved in a disciplinary incident at school.  Rose Tree 
suspended G.S. for three days, extended the suspension to ten days, and threatened him 
with expulsion.  G.S.’s parents challenged Rose Tree’s actions.  The parties resolved the 
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matter pursuant to a written Settlement Agreement.  Rose Tree, for its part, agreed to 
pay for G.S. to attend a school outside of its jurisdiction for the 2015–16 school year.  In 
exchange, G.S.’s parents agreed to waive all claims through August 31, 2016.  The 
Settlement Agreement also included a provision purporting to waive G.S.’s right to 
claim homelessness after the 2015–16 academic year.   
Pursuant to the Agreement, G.S. attended a school outside Rose Tree for the 
2015–16 school year.  Following the conclusion of that academic year, in July 2016, 
G.S.’s parents notified Rose Tree of the family’s intent to re-enroll G.S. in one of its 
schools for the 2016–17 academic year.  Rose Tree refused to enroll G.S., reasoning that 
his parents had waived his right to claim homelessness and thereby enroll under 
McKinney-Vento.   
G.S.’s parents initiated state grievance proceedings.  After conducting an inquiry, 
the Pennsylvania Department of Education issued a determination letter, stating:  
the outcome of our investigation is that [G.S.] . . . ha[s] the 
right under the federal McKinney-Vento Homelessness Act to 
continue being educated in the Rose Tree Media School 
District since it is [his] school district of origin and [he] is 
temporarily residing in a doubled up living situation that is not 
fixed, regular nor adequate. 
 
 (Appellee’s Br. 6)  G.S.’s parents again attempted to enroll G.S. in Rose Tree, but the 
School District again refused.  
 Throughout the pendency of this matter, Rose Tree continued to enroll G.S.’ 
sister, S.S, in one of its schools.  The parties do not dispute that S.S.’s living conditions 
are identical to that of G.S.  
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 G.S. and his parents filed suit in federal court, Case No. 16-4782, against Rose 
Tree, seeking enrollment.  Rose Tree filed a separate lawsuit in federal court, Case No. 
16-4849, against G.S.’s parents, seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to enroll 
G.S.  The District Court consolidated the two cases in February 2017.  Both parties 
moved for summary judgment.  The District Court resolved both motions in a single 
order, finding in favor of G.S.  Rose Tree timely appealed.  On appeal, the Education 
Law Center, the Homeless Children’s Education Fund, the National Law Center of 
Homelessness and Poverty, and the People’s Emergency Center appear as amici in 
support of G.S. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment.  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
III. 
Rose Tree argues that the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees was 
erroneous because:  (1) G.S.’s parents waived his McKinney-Vento rights for the 2016–
17 academic year in the Settlement Agreement; (2) G.S. is no longer “homeless” within 
the meaning of the Act; and (3) enrollment in Rose Tree is not in G.S.’s “best interest.”   
A. 
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether G.S.’s parents waived his 
McKinney-Vento rights in the Settlement Agreement.  The parties agree that 
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Pennsylvania law governs our interpretation of the Agreement.  Under Pennsylvania 
law, “[t]he fundamental rule in contract interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the 
contracting parties.”  Ins. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 462, 
468 (Pa. 2006) (internal citation omitted).  “In cases of a written contract, the intent of 
the parties is the writing itself . . . When the terms of a contract are clear and 
unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the document itself.”  Id. 
(internal citations omitted).  
In relevant part, the Settlement Agreement includes a provision purporting to 
waive G.S.’s McKinney-Vento rights for the 2016–17 academic year.  This provision 
states: 
Parents agree that they will make no claim of homeless status 
after the 2015-16 school year and that the District will have 
no further obligations to Student after the 2015-16 school 
year. 
 
(App. 107).  The District Court concluded that the waiver was unenforceable for lack of 
consideration.  We agree. 
Under Pennsylvania law, consideration is an essential element of a valid contract.  
See Taylor v. Stanley Co. of Am., 158 A. 157, 158 (Pa. 1932); see also Johnston the 
Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 516 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).  In 
addition to the waiver provision excerpted above, the Settlement Agreement includes a 
provision titled “Adequate Consideration.”  This provision states: 
Adequate Consideration. The Parents specifically 
acknowledge and agree that the District’s agreement to make 
the above payments is intended to and does provide the 
Parents with sufficient consideration for a settlement and 
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compromise of any and all outstanding education and 
discrimination claims that they may now have or have had, 
whether known or unknown, from the beginning of time 
through August 31, 2016. The Parents also expressly 
acknowledge and confirm that: (1) the only consideration for 
their signing of this Agreement consists of the terms and 
provisions stated herein; and (2) no other promise or 
agreement of any kind, save those set forth in this Agreement, 
has been made by any person or entity whatsoever to cause 
them to sign the document. 
 
 (Appellee’s Br. 3-4) (emphasis in original).   
Rose Tree argues, in conclusory fashion, that the family received “adequate” and 
“substantial consideration for all of the promises made . . . .”  (Appellant’s Br. 6.)  
Appellees counter that the “Adequate Consideration” provision of the Agreement 
expressly limits consideration to claims arising before August 31, 2016, and thus any 
waiver of claims concerning the 2016–17 academic year lacks consideration.  
(Appellees’ Br. 11–12, 15–16.)  As the District Court concluded, the clear and 
unambiguous language of this provision states that consideration was only provided for 
claims through August 31, 2016, which pre-dates claims arising out of the 2016–17 
academic year.  Accordingly, we agree that any purported waiver of claims arising after 
August 31, 2016, lacks consideration and is unenforceable.   
B. 
 Next, Rose Tree contends it need not enroll G.S. because he is no longer 
“homeless” within the meaning of the Act.  Subtitle VII-B of the Act, “Education for 
Homeless Children and Youths” (“EHCY”), addresses the educational barriers faced by 
homeless children.  EHCY preserves the right of equal access to a “free, appropriate 
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public education” independent of a child’s housing status.  42 U.S.C. § 11431(1). 
Specifically, under this subtitle, local education agencies are required to continue a 
homeless child’s education in his or her “school of origin” for the “duration” of his or 
her homelessness if doing so is in the child’s “best interest.”   Id. § 11432(g)(3)(A)(i).  
Notably, there is no statutory limit on the duration of homelessness.   
Whether a child is eligible under EHCY is determined by the Act’s definition of 
youth homelessness, 42 U.S.C. § 11434a(2).  In relevant part, this definition provides: 
The term “homeless children and youths”— 
 
(A) means individuals who lack a fixed, regular, and 
adequate nighttime residence (within the meaning of 
section 11302(a)(1) of this title); and 
 
(B) includes— 
 
(i) children and youths who are sharing the 
housing of other persons due to loss of 
housing, economic hardship, or a similar 
reason; . . . 
 
Id. § 11434a(2).  Children who satisfy § 11434a(2)(B)(i) are often described as living 
“doubled up.”  See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Education for Homeless Children and Youths 
Program Non-Regulatory Guidance, 5 (2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/essa/160240ehcyguidance072716.pdf. 
There is no dispute that G.S. satisfied § 11434(a)(2) when he first moved in with 
his maternal grandmother.  Rather, the question is whether G.S. continues to satisfy this 
definition almost four years later.  Rose Tree argues that G.S. no longer lacks a fixed, 
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regular, and adequate nighttime residence due to the fact that his doubled-up living 
arrangement has persisted for several years.  We are not convinced.   
First, Rose Tree’s interpretation is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the 
statute.  There is no dispute that G.S. continues to satisfy § 11434a(2)(B)(i), which is 
listed as a specific example of youth homelessness.  Second, the Act does not impose a 
limit on the duration of homelessness.  This undermines Rose Tree’s argument that a 
doubled-up arrangement can transform into a fixed, adequate, and regular nighttime 
residence if it persists long enough.  Third, Rose Tree fails to cite any authority other 
than general provisions of the Act and the dictionary for its interpretation.  This is 
unsurprising—to date, no court has adopted Rose Tree’s interpretation.  Fourth, several 
circumstances particular to this case persuade us that G.S. is eligible for coverage.  Rose 
Tree initially treated G.S. as homeless, and the parties agree his living arrangements 
have not changed.  It is also compelling that Rose Tree has continued to enroll G.S.’s 
similarly situated sister, S.S., throughout the duration of this matter.2  And finally, the 
Pennsylvania Department of Education determined that G.S. remains homeless.  
Although we are not bound by the Agency’s determination, we think it is well-reasoned 
and, therefore, instructive.  To remove G.S. from the protections of the Act under these 
circumstances strikes us as nothing short of arbitrary.  Accordingly, we agree that G.S. 
continues to qualify as homeless for purposes of enrollment in a Rose Tree school.
                                              
2 Although S.S. is enrolled, the record is unclear as to whether Rose Tree still 
considers her to be homeless within the meaning of the McKinney-Vento Act.  At oral 
argument, the School District took the position that while S.S. was homeless at the start 
of the 2016–17 academic year, she may not be homeless currently.   
  
 
C. 
Finally, assuming G.S. qualifies as homeless, Rose Tree argues it need not enroll 
G.S. because enrollment is not in his best interest.  It raises this argument for the first 
time on appeal and thus we need not consider it.  See Caisson Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand 
Co., 622 F.2d 672, 680 (3d Cir. 1980).  Nonetheless, we take a moment to reject this 
argument on its merits. 
A school district is required to enroll a homeless student so long as doing so 
accords with the child’s “best interest.”  42 U.S.C. § 11432(g)(3)(A).  It is presumed that 
the best interest of the student is to remain in his or her school of origin unless doing so 
is contrary to the request of the parent or youth.  Id. § 11432(g)(3)(B).  School of origin 
“means [either] the school that a child or youth attended when permanently housed or 
the school in which the child or youth was last enrolled, including a preschool.”  Id. § 
11432(g)(3)(I)(i). 
 Here, all of the statutory considerations align to suggest enrollment in Rose Tree 
is in G.S.’s best interest.  Rose Tree hosts the school where G.S. was enrolled when he 
became homeless; the school where G.S. was last enrolled; the school where his sister 
attends; and the school where he and his parents seek enrollment.  Under these 
circumstances, we conclude that continued enrollment in Rose Tree is in G.S.’s best 
interest. 
IV.  
For these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dated July 31, 
2017. 
